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A B S T R A C T
A wealth of research in recent decades has investigated the effects of various forms of coordination upon pro-
social attitudes and behavior. To structure and constrain this research, we provide a framework within which to
distinguish and interrelate different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underpinning various
prosocial effects of various forms of coordination. To this end, we introduce a set of definitions and distinctions
that can be used to tease apart various forms of prosociality and coordination. We then identify a range of
psychological mechanisms that may underpin the effects of coordination upon prosociality. We show that dif-
ferent hypotheses about the underlying psychological mechanisms motivate different predictions about the ef-
fects of various forms of coordination in different circumstances.
1. Introduction
From marching in step to cooking meals, assembling furniture and
forming political parties, coordination is a pervasive and important
feature of human sociality. Indeed, we humans are uniquely able and
motivated to coordinate our movements as well as our decisions, en-
abling us to achieve our goals more efficiently than we otherwise could,
and in many cases to achieve goals that we could not achieve alone
(Garrod & Pickering, 2009; Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith,
2010; Melis & Semmann, 2010; Silk, 2009; Skyrms, 2004; Tomasello,
2009).
In addition to these direct benefits of coordination, a wealth of re-
search in recent years has provided evidence of potentially important
indirect benefits arising from the effects of coordination upon prosocial
attitudes and behavior. For example, it has been shown that co-
ordination can enhance rapport (Bernieri, 1988) and trust (Launay,
Dean, & Bailes, 2013; Mitkidis, McGraw, Roepstorff, & Wallot, 2015),
and provide a boost to cooperation in social dilemmas (Guala &
Mittone, 2010; Rusch & Luetge, 2016; Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami,
& Van Knippenberg, 2004; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) as well as
helping behaviors (Kokal, Engel, Kirschner, & Keysers, 2011; Valdesolo
& DeSteno, 2011), obedience (Wiltermuth, 2012) and commitment to
joint actions (Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016a, 2016b). Moreover,
the mere observation of interpersonal coordination creates a perception
of rapport (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2009), unity (Lakens, 2010; Lakens
& Stel, 2011), and the impression of a shared goal (Ip, Chiu, & Wan,
2006). There has even been researching indicating that the effects of
coordination on prosociality emerge in early childhood (Barragan &
Dweck, 2014; Cirelli, Einarson, & Trainor, 2014; Fawcett & Tunçgenç,
2017; Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012).1
While this research continues to increase our knowledge of the ef-
fects of various forms of coordination upon prosocial attitudes and
behavior, we have yet to develop a systematic understanding of the
psychological mechanisms underpinning these effects (but see Cross,
Turgeon, & Atherton, 2019 for a theoretical review paper summarizing
and organizing much of this research). This makes it difficult to spell
out testable predictions about many interesting cases in which co-
ordination may or may not boost prosociality. What, for example, about
cases in which two agents attempt to coordinate but do not succeed? In
attempting to coordinate, they may signal to each other that they are
interested in cooperating with each other; on the other hand, their
failure may indicate to them that they are not well-suited to cooperate
with each other. Similarly, what about instances in which two agents
are mutually adapting to each other while performing very different
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actions (A blows into a trumpet while B plays the drums), or performing
similar actions in a non-synchronized but nevertheless temporally co-
ordinated pattern, for example in anti-phase synchronization (i.e. A
taps her finger while B raises his, then vice versa, etc…)2? On the one
hand, A and B are mutually adapting to each other to maintain a pat-
tern, so one might expect them to develop positive attitudes towards
each other – and indeed there is some evidence to support this (Cirelli
et al., 2014; Miles et al., 2009). On the other hand, they are repeatedly
performing different or even opposite actions, so one might expect them
to not identify each other as good candidates for cooperation – and
there is some evidence to support this as well (Wiltermuth, 2012). In
borderline cases such as these, specific predictions should be motivated
by background theory about how and why coordination boosts proso-
ciality at all. And indeed, theoretical models of the psychological me-
chanisms mediating prosocial effects of coordination may also inform
experimenters' decisions about which cases to treat as control condi-
tions in experiments.
In the following, our aim will be to provide a framework within
which to distinguish and interrelate different hypotheses about the
psychological mechanisms underpinning various prosocial effects of
various forms of coordination. We will begin by introducing a set of
definitions and distinctions that can be used to tease apart various
forms of prosociality and coordination (Section 2). We will then identify
a range of possible psychological mechanisms (Section 3). As we shall
see, different hypotheses about the underlying psychological mechan-
isms motivate different predictions about the effects of various forms of
coordination in different circumstances (Section 4). Thus, a systematic
overview of the theoretical landscape will provide structure and con-
straints to further empirical research.
2. Definitions and distinctions
In this section we will introduce some key definitions and distinc-
tions. We begin by introducing a broad working definition of co-
ordination, and then identifying factors which enable us to distinguish
among a range of different forms that coordination can take. We then
offer working definitions of prosocial behavior and attitudes.
2.1. Defining coordination
In defining coordination, we take what can be called a minimal
approach (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Michael et al., 2016a, 2016b;
Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010) – i.e., stipulating the
minimum number of requirements to characterize the phenomenon of
interest, and using this as a starting point from which to identify ad-
ditional features that may serve as criteria for distinguishing among
different forms of the phenomenon. With this in mind, we propose the
following minimal definition of coordination: An agent is coordinating
with another agent to the extent that she adapts her actions or decisions to
the actions or decisions of that other agent, i.e. to the extent that she acts or
decides as she does at least in part because of the observed or expected
actions or decisions of the other agent. With this as our starting point, it
will be possible to isolate the respective contributions of these different
features to bringing about various prosocial effects on attitudes and/or
behavior.
First, the minimal definition requires only that the actions or deci-
sions of one agent be adapted to those of at least one other agent, not
that both adapt to each other. In other words, coordination may be
unidirectional or bidirectional. Some of the instances of coordination
implemented in the research under discussion here are instances of
bidirectional coordination (e.g. Konvalinka et al., 2010; Wiltermuth &
Heath, 2009). Other studies however implement unidirectional co-
ordination, for example with a confederate assuming the role of ‘fol-
lower’ and coordinating her/his actions with those of a participant, who
is in the role of ‘leader’ (Kokal et al., 2011; Sacheli, Tidoni, Pavone,
Aglioti, & Candidi, 2013). Unidirectional scenarios make it possible to
probe the effects of coordination independently of a participant's in-
tention to coordinate. For instance, although the leader may or may not
be acting with the intention to coordinate with the follower in uni-
directional scenarios, the effects of coordination on the leader's proso-
cial attitudes towards the follower can still be probed.
Second, the minimal definition does not specify how the adaptation
of actions or decisions is achieved. Typically, individuals are able to
adapt to each other by perceiving each other's actions (e.g. when lifting
an object together) or the effects of those actions (e.g. sounds produced
by tapping or drumming). In other cases, the coordination may be di-
rected by an external agent or entity, as when musicians in an orchestra
are directed by a conductor. In experimental research, participants are
sometimes instructed to adapt their actions to a rhythm indicated by an
external cue (Cross, Wilson, & Golonka, 2016; Hove & Risen, 2009). In
these cases, the participants may only coordinate with each other as a
side effect of coordinating with the external cue. When this is the case,
coordination may not provide a basis for drawing any inferences about
one's partner's attitudes or about her or his willingness to adapt.
Third, the minimal definition does not require that there be a goal to
the adaptation of actions or decisions.3 With this point in mind,
Knoblich, Butterfill, and Sebanz (2011) introduce a distinction between
emergent coordination and planned coordination. In emergent coordina-
tion, actions or decisions are coordinated without a goal – i.e. there is
no goal subserved by the coordination, nor is the coordination itself a
goal. For instance, pedestrians often fall into the same walking patterns
(Van Ulzen, Lamoth, Daffertshofer, Semin, & Beek, 2008) and people
engaged in conversation synchronize their body sway (Shockley,
Santana, & Fowler, 2003) and mimic one another's mannerisms
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). In such cases, ‘coordinated behavior occurs
due to perception-action couplings that make multiple individuals act
in similar ways; it is independent of any joint plans or common
knowledge (which may be altogether absent). Rather, agents may
process perceptual and motor cues in the same way as each other. E.g.
mimicry, entrainment’ (Knoblich et al., 2011: p. 62). In planned co-
ordination, in contrast, two agents coordinate their actions or decisions
in order to bring about a particular outcome that requires that they
coordinate. In such cases, the outcome may be something over and
above the coordination of actions or decisions (e.g., carrying a table out
of the room), but the planned outcome may be coordination itself (such
as when two agents are engaged in dancing). Here, the ‘behavior is
driven by representations specifying the goal of joint action and the
individual contributions to the goal’ (Knoblich et al., 2011: p. 62)[1].
This distinction matters because emergent coordination may provide
less indication about one's partner's willingness to adapt to one's ac-
tions, as compared to planned coordination.
Fourth, the minimal definition specifies no criterion for success of
coordination. There are many cases in which two agents attempt to
adapt their behavior or decisions to each other (or when one of them
does so unilaterally) in pursuance of a goal. The criteria for success will
depend on the particular goal, which may be internal or external to the
coordination. For example, when drumming together, the criterion for
success may be reducing asynchronies below a particular threshold (i.e.
a goal that is internal to the coordination). Or, when jointly moving a
couch to another room, the criterion for success may be to achieve the
2 This is in contrast to in-phase coordination (e.g. A taps her finger as B taps
his, they both raise their fingers at the same time, then again tap them at the
same time, etc).
3 Indeed, the minimal definition does not by itself rule out cases in which
agents are adapting to each other in pursuance of conflicting goals, e.g. in
competitive sports. We put such cases to the side, as competition has not been a
topic of interest in the context of research investigating the effects of co-
ordination upon prosociality.
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outcome that the couch be in the other room (i.e. a goal that is external
to the coordination). And indeed, by manipulating coordination de-
mands, experimentalists may influence the extent to which coordina-
tion is likely to be successful, and thereby disentangle any prosocial
effects of the attempt to coordinate from the effects of coordination
success. Kokal et al. (2011) for example used this method to implement
a control condition in which coordination was unsuccessful, and ob-
served significantly lower helping rates (their target prosociality mea-
sure) than in the test condition in which coordination was successful.
On the other hand, one might interpret another agent's attempt to co-
ordinate as a signal that she is willing to be accommodating and to
invest effort in an interaction, which may make her into an attractive
interaction partner. Finally, it is also worth highlighting a distinction
between different (but not incompatible) forms of coordination: ‘sen-
sorimotor coordination’ and ‘decision-making coordination’. This distinc-
tion broadly corresponds to different ways in which coordination has
been investigated in different domains of empirical research. Most of
the psychological research investigating prosocial effects of coordina-
tion has focused on the former. i.e. the adaptation of actions between
two agents. More specifically, much of this research has investigated
what Cross, Wilson, and Golonka (2019) have termed ‘coordinated
rhythmic movement’, which they define as ‘a special class of co-
ordination that involves aligning one's physical movements with an-
other person's, in time to a common rhythm’ (p. 248). In parallel to this,
an independent strand of research has also begun investigating proso-
cial effects of coordinated decision-making in behavioral economics. In
coordinated decision-making, agents adapt their decisions in light of
what each other is likely to decide. Coordinated decision-making has
been studied extensively within behavioral economics using coordina-
tion games (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1990; Guala & Mittone,
2010; Rusch & Luetge, 2016; Schelling, 1960; Skyrms, 2004; Van
Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1990). The key feature of coordination games is
that both players receive higher payoffs if they choose the same option
than if they do not. Everyday examples of coordinated decision-making
include motorists choosing to drive on the right (or left) side of the
road, and political parties forming strategic coalitions to enact their
legislative agendas. Most research involving coordinated decision-
making requires each agent to make a decision in light of what she
expects the other agent to decide, and to do so in pursuance of the goal
of achieving the best outcome (typically this means the best outcome
for herself, although it can also be understood as the best outcome for
both players or for some other agent(s)). In this sense, they involve
planned coordination. This does not mean however that all decision-
making coordination is planned. Trends in fashion, restaurants and
music may be considered as cases of emergent decision-making co-
ordination.
2.2. Prosociality
Prosociality is commonly defined as ‘behaviors that are intended to
benefit others’ (Jensen, 2016; see also: Batson & Powell, 2003; Decety,
Bartal, Uzefovsky, & Knafo-Noam, 2016; Eisenberg, 1982; Staub, 1978).
However, as Jensen has recently pointed out, this definition of proso-
ciality is not as straightforward as it may seem at first blush. In parti-
cular, it is important to highlight two complications, one methodolo-
gical and one theoretical. First, consider the requirement that there be
an intention to benefit others. The reason for this requirement is to ex-
clude cases in which an agent brings a benefit to some other agent by
accident or as a side effect of some other action. In practice, however, it
may often be difficult to evaluate whether there is an intention, in
particular in the case of pre-linguistic children or non-human animals (a
point also noted by Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).
Secondly, the standard definition does not specify whether the aim
of benefiting others must be the ultimate aim, or whether behaviors
qualify as prosocial if they are performed in order to benefit others but
with an ulterior motive. And indeed, some authors accept that
behaviors can be prosocial in spite of an ulterior motive (e.g. Decety
et al., 2016). There are many different kinds of ulterior motive of
course. Some ulterior motives may be morally neutral, such as aiming
to maintain one's reputation (indirect reciprocity) or to motivate the
recipient of the prosocial action to reciprocate in the future (direct
reciprocity). Other ulterior motives may be decidedly antisocial. For
example, the witch in Hansel and Gretel feeds the children (providing
them a benefit) in order to fatten them up before eating them.
In view of these complications, we propose to work with a revised
definition of prosocial behavior: An action qualifies as prosocial if its
performance is sensitive to the benefit to the other agent. More specifically,
an action qualifies as prosocial if the agent would be less likely to perform
that action if, other things being equal, it did not benefit the other agent. This
definition is in the spirit of the same minimal approach we have taken
to defining coordination: it operationalizes prosociality in a manner
that avoids the methodological difficulty of intention attribution, and
which does not attempt to rule out cases in which an ulterior motive is
also present. It does however rule out cases in which an agent brings
about a benefit to another agent solely as a means of achieving some
further aim.
Behavioral measures of prosociality often draw upon economic
games developed within the tradition of game theory. These games
make it possible to quantify (typically using monetary incentives)
participants' prosociality – i.e. their willingness to make decisions
which benefit others – under various circumstances (Camerer, 2011).
The most famous of these is the prisoners' dilemma, which can be used
to assess participants' willingness to cooperate when they could stand to
gain more individually by defecting (Flood, Dresher, & Tucker, 2010;
Nash, 1950). It is also quite common to implement public goods games,
which have the same structure as prisoners' dilemmas but can include
more than two players (Cross et al., 2016; Fischer, Callander, Reddish,
& Bulbulia, 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Since cooperation in the
prisoners' dilemmas and the public goods game depends upon partici-
pants' not only being prosocially inclined towards the other player(s)
but also to trust them, dictator games (Güth, Schmittberger, &
Schwarze, 1982) are sometimes preferred. By measuring how much of
an initial endowment participants (in the role of the ‘dictator’ are
willing to give freely to a recipient, dictator games are thought to
provide a comparatively direct measure of prosocial motivation (Engel,
2011; Guala & Mittone, 2010). As a further alternative, the trust game
devised by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) is often also im-
plemented as a measure (Cross et al., 2016; Lang, Bahna, Shaver,
Reddish, & Xygalatas, 2017). It is designed to measure participants' (i.e.
the ‘investor's’) trust by probing their willingness to pass a sum of
money to another participant (i.e. the ‘trustee’), given that the sum that
is transferred will be multiplied by some number (often 3), after which
the trustee can choose to return any amount (including 0) to the in-
vestor. Some studies also implement scenarios in which a participant
has an opportunity to help another agent perform some instrumental
task, such as picking up something that an experimenter has dropped
(Barragan & Dweck, 2014; Kokal et al., 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno,
2011).
What about prosocial attitudes? It is worth highlighting a compli-
cation at this stage: since prosocial attitudes are not behaviors at all,
they do not fall under the definition of prosociality we have given
above. One possibility would be to characterize them as attitudes that
dispose or motivate individuals to perform prosocial behavior. This
would be problematic if the category of prosocial behaviors included
cases in which an agent performs an action that benefits another agent
but does so solely as a means of achieving some further aim. The reason
why this would be problematic is that any attitude that motivates an
agent to perform such an action would qualify as a prosocial attitude.
This would include, for example, greed, which may motivate an agent
to help someone cross the street with the further aim of picking their
pocket. But we have ruled out such cases by restricting the category of
prosocial behaviors to cases in which an agent is motivated at least in
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part by the aim of bringing about a benefit to a recipient. We therefore
stipulate that prosocial attitudes are those which motivate agents to
perform actions that bring benefits to others at least in part because those
actions bring those benefits.
To probe prosocial attitudes, participants are typically asked to fill
out questionnaires assessing the degree of trust, closeness, connected-
ness and/or similarity they experience in relation to their partner (Cross
et al., 2016; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). As a more implicit measure,
participants are sometimes asked to indicate the amount of overlap they
perceive between themselves and their partner using the Inclusion of the
Other in Self (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Stupacher, Maes,
Witte, & Wood, 2017). Typically, these are used as secondary measures
in order to test hypotheses about the mechanisms underpinning the
effects of coordination on prosocial behavior (Cross et al., 2016; Lang
et al., 2017).
Typically, these prosocial behaviors or attitudes are directed to-
wards the same agent as the participant previously coordinated with.
Indeed, in some cases it has been shown that the prosocial effects do not
extend to others (Wiltermuth, 2012), indicating that they are agent-
specific. Some studies, however, have shown that the prosocial effects
do extend to third parties who are affiliated with the coordination
partner (Cirelli, Wan, & Trainor, 2016), or even to third parties who are
not presented as being in any way affiliated with the coordination
partner (Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer, 2014). This raises the question as
to whether, when and why we should expect the prosocial effects of
coordination to be agent-specific, or to generalize (e.g. to members of a
particular group, or even to people in general)? Answers to this ques-
tion are likely to differ according to one's background hypothesis about
how and why coordination has such effects at all. We will return to this
issue below.
3. Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce two orthogonal distinctions among
types of hypothesized mechanism underpinning the effects of co-
ordination on prosocial behavior and attitudes. The first distinction
(Section 3.1) is among sources of motivation to engage in prosocial
behavior which may be boosted by coordination: concern for others' well-
being, trust, and a sense of commitment. The second (Section 3.2) is be-
tween two mechanisms by which coordination may lead one to identify
some other agent as an appropriate target of prosocial behavior: via
group-identification or by agent-specific selection mechanisms.
3.1. Mechanisms for generating prosocial motivation
The first distinction is among sources of motivation to engage in
prosocial behavior which might be boosted by coordination: concern for
others' well-being, trust, and a sense of commitment. The first of these –
concern for others' well-being – is the most direct source of prosocial
motivation. Indeed, we take it that to be motivated to perform an action
out of concern for some other individual's well-being is to perform the
action because it is in some other agent's interest. In this sense, it may
be thought of as the prosocial core of prosociality (recall that our de-
finition of prosociality requires that an agent perform an action at least
in part because it benefits some other individual). Much of the research
in this area can be interpreted as investigating the effects of coordina-
tion upon this source of prosocial motivation – e.g. using dictator games
(Guala & Mittone, 201) or prisoners' dilemmas (Rusch & Luetge, 2016),
or by implementing scenarios in which help is required (Barragan &
Dweck, 2014; Kokal et al., 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011).
However, concern for one's partner's well-being may not always be
sufficient to drive prosocial behavior. This is because some prosocial
acts (e.g. helping to move a heavy object) may be risky insofar as they
require one to rely on others. They may, for example, expose one to the
risk of being taken advantage of (while one is preoccupied with the
heavy object, the other agent may pick one's pocket), or of wasting one's
efforts (e.g., if one's partner abandons the idea of moving the heavy
object). For this reason, it is also important to consider the role of trust
in supporting prosocial behavior – and indeed much of the research in
this area does probe trust, either using trust/investment games (Cross
et al., 2016; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) or by administering ques-
tionnaires (Cross et al., 2016; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2013).4
Recently, some research has highlighted a third, distinct source of
motivation for prosocial behavior which may be boosted by coordina-
tion. Specifically, recent findings support the hypothesis that co-
ordination may boost prosocial behavior by eliciting a sense of com-
mitment to perform an action because one's partner is relying on one
(Michael et al., 2016a). This is because, when two agents coordinate
their contributions to a joint action, they form and implement inter-
dependent, i.e. mutually contingent, action plans. For instance, when
coordinating to move a pile of sand from a path agents may decide to
form a chain, where one agent scoops up the sand and passes it to the
other agent to be disposed of. The agents thus form interdependent
action plans. Each agent must therefore have – and rely upon – ex-
pectations about what the other agent is going to do. Indeed, the higher
the degree of coordination, the more spatiotemporally exact those ex-
pectations must be. One important consequence is that an agent's per-
formance of her contribution within a highly coordinated joint action
expresses her expectations about the other agent's upcoming actions, as
well as her reliance upon those expectations. This may generate social
pressure on the other agent to perform actions in order to avoid dis-
appointing the expectations and wasting a partner's efforts.
3.2. Mechanisms for identifying recipients of prosociality
The second distinction we introduce is between two mechanisms by
which coordination might lead us to identify another individual as an
appropriate recipient of prosociality. Specifically, coordination may be
thought to boost prosociality via group identification and/or via agent-
specific factors. In other words, coordination may lead individuals to
view each other as belonging to the same group, and to be prosocially
disposed for this reason, or it may lead them to be prosocially disposed
specifically to each other as individuals.
3.2.1. Group-level mechanisms
One prevalent idea in the literature is that coordination serves as an
indicator that the individual with whom one is coordinating is similar
to oneself and/or that s/he shares one's interests or goals, and that one
therefore comes to view the other individual as part of one's social
group (For a recent articulation of this view and review of the literature
bearing upon it, see Cross, Turgeon, & Atherton, 2019). There are at
least three ways in which coordination may indicate similarity between
agents - at the level of behavior (i.e. doing the same thing at the same
time), at the level goals (i.e. pursuing the same goals), and at the level
of attentional focus (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) suggest that
joint attention can lead individuals to perceive each other as members
of a common group). However similarity is identified, the effects of
coordination upon prosociality would then result from group identifi-
cation. This group-identification hypothesis is motivated by research
showing that people tend to exhibit favoritism towards ingroup mem-
bers identified as such on the basis of cues as simple as wearing the
same colors (Tajfel, 1970; Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016; Turner, Brown, &
Tajfel, 1979) or supporting the same sports team (Levine, Prosser,
Evans, & Reicher, 2005).
The group-identification hypothesis is compatible with all three of
the candidate mechanisms we distinguished at the motivational level.
Identifying someone as an ingroup member may lead one to trust her
more, since her interests qua ingroup member are likely to be relatively
well aligned with one's own. Or, one may come to take an interest in
4 For an overview of this research, see Cross, Turgeon, & Atherton, 2019.
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their well-being irrespective of trust, and without any ulterior motive -
one may develop genuine concern for the other agent's well-being.
Thirdly, group-identification may elicit a sense of commitment to the
partner qua group member. This is because shared membership in a
group may raise the expectation that one will act in another agent's
interest (Michael et al., 2016a, 2016b).
3.2.2. Agent-specific mechanisms
A distinct possibility is that coordination may boost prosociality by
providing information about the specific individual with whom one is
coordinating. For example, if coordination is successful, it may serve as
a cue to the other individual's competence at a particular task or in
general - evolutionarily, it may indeed have been important to choose
competent partners for important endeavors (e.g. for hunting or pa-
trolling). In addition to information about others' competence, co-
ordination may also serve as an indication of a partner's relevant dis-
positions. In particular, coordination indicates that a partner is willing
to adapt her behavior, and to pay attention to one's own actions in order
to facilitate adaptation. This might be deliberate – e.g., by holding the
door open for someone, you indicate that you are paying attention to
her and willing to adapt your behavior to facilitate her goal of getting
through the doorway. But in many cases it is a side effect – e.g. if the
driver of a car indicates that she will turn left, you might slow down to
avoid a crash. In this case you are not slowing down with the aim of
indicating to the other driver that you are willing to adapt to her in
order to facilitate coordination, but she might nonetheless recognize
this. If, in cases like this, I recognize that some other agent is willing to
adapt to me, it may elicit prosocial behavior in future interactions with
this agent. This is because her willingness to adapt is a form of effort
investment, and the perception that another agent is investing effort to
facilitate my own goals can elicit prosocial behaviors and attitudes
(Chennells & Michael, 2018; Green, McEllin, & Michael, 2019; Székely
& Michael, 2018).
As with the group-identification hypothesis, all three candidate
mechanisms at the motivational level are consistent with the hypothesis
that the perception of a partner's effortful investment to coordination
may boost prosocial attitudes or behavior towards that specific partner:
trust, concern for the partner's well-being and a sense of commitment.
Let us consider each in turn.
First, the perception of a partner's effort investment may give rise to
a concern for her well-being. This is because effort investment may be
an indication of the other agent's care for you, or it may indicate that
this agent is a friend or close collaborator. In these ways, perception of
a partner's effort investment may lead one to value and/or respect her,
and to like her personally as a result of this.
A second possibility about how coordination boosts prosociality is
that the other agent's willingness to pay attention and adapt may pro-
vide evidence that she will also be willing to do this in future interac-
tions, thereby providing grounds for trusting her. If so, it could be in my
interest to maintain a good relationship with her with a view to future
interactions. This would be a case of direct reciprocity. It is also con-
sistent with the interdependence hypothesis, insofar as the other agent's
willingness to adapt may indicate that her interests are aligned with
mine, and that it is therefore in my own interest to support her.
A third possibility is that coordination may give rise to a sense of
commitment to one's interaction partner. In support of this, Michael
et al. (2016a) reported evidence that the degree of coordination in a
joint action also enhances observers' perception of the agents' com-
mitment to the joint action. Building on this, Székely and Michael
(2018) (cf. also Chennells & Michael, 2018) found that the motivation
to remain engaged in a boring joint action, and to resist tempting al-
ternative options and distractions, is governed in part by an implicit
sense of commitment which is modulated by the amount of effort that
one's partner has invested in the joint action. That is, recognition of the
other agent's willingness to coordinate (indicated by her investment of
effort in the joint task) boosts prosocial behavior (operationalised as
persistence with the boring joint task) by fostering a sense of commit-
ment to the other agent. The commitment hypothesis is consistent with
direct or indirect reciprocity, and also with the interdependence hy-
pothesis.
4. Linking theory to predictions
In the previous section, we introduced two orthogonal distinctions.
The first distinction was drawn among types of motivation under-
pinning the prosocial attitudes and/or behavior: we distinguished trust,
concern for others' well-being, and the sense of commitment. The
second distinction referred to the target of prosocial behavior: it was
drawn between mechanisms whereby coordination boosts prosocial
attitudes and/or behavior via group identification and mechanisms
whereby it does so in an agent-specific manner, i.e. without group
identification. In this section, we offer some suggestions for disen-
tangling the different hypothesized factors picked out by these dis-
tinctions. We begin with the distinction between group-level and agent-
specific mechanisms.
4.1. Group-level or agent-specific mechanisms?
What specific predictions might differentiate between group-iden-
tification and agent-specific mechanisms as hypotheses underpinning
the effects of coordination on prosociality? The key difference which
provides a useful starting point for identifying contrasting predictions is
that the group-identification hypothesis is based upon the idea that
coordination acts as a cue to similarity, whereas the agent-specific
hypothesis is based upon the idea that a partner's willingness to adapt
can trigger prosocial attitudes and behavior. In spelling out these pre-
dictions, it will be important to recall, as noted above, that there are at
least three levels at which coordination may provide a cue to similarity,
and thus to shared group membership: namely, at the level of beha-
viors, at the level of goals, or at the level of attentional focus. We will
proceed by considering characteristic features, or parameters, of si-
tuations involving coordination (as identified above, in Section 2.1) and
asking whether the contrasting hypotheses generate different predic-
tions about these parameters.
4.1.1. Unidirectional versus bidirectional coordination
The group identification hypothesis and the agent-specific hypoth-
esis lead to different predictions in cases of unidirectional coordination.
In particular, we should only predict that the direction of unidirectional
coordination matters for agent-specific hypotheses. Assuming that A is
following B's lead, agent-specific hypotheses predict higher prosociality
from B towards A because the coordination signals A's willingness to
adapt to B. In contrast, either direction of uni-directional coordination
signals similarity between A and B, so the group identification hy-
pothesis does not predict that the direction of coordination makes a
difference with respect to subsequent prosociality.
4.1.2. Successful versus unsuccessful coordination
Insofar as the group identification hypothesis assumes that group-
identification is triggered by the perception of self-other similarity at
the level of behavior, we suggest that it does not predict a boost to
prosociality through unsuccessful coordination. In contrast, versions of
this hypothesis which assume that group-identification is triggered by
the perception of similarity at the level of goals or attentional focus
should indeed predict that unsuccessful coordination will provide a
boost to prosociality. This is because the mere attempt to coordinate
and/or to engage in joint attention may signal that one is a group-
member (by signaling that agents share the same goals/interests). The
agent-specific hypothesis also predicts that coordination should provide
a boost to prosociality irrespective of how successful it is, because even
unsuccessful coordination provides evidence that one's partner is willing
to adapt - it's the thought that counts. And indeed, this is consistent
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with existing findings (Cross et al., 2016; Kirschner & Ilari, 2014;
Launay et al., 2013).
4.1.3. Emergent versus planned coordination
Next, the group-identification hypothesis does not appear to provide
us with a reason to predict differences between emergent and planned
coordination. This is because it implies that similarity (whether of be-
havior, goals or attentional focus) itself triggers prosociality, irrespec-
tive of whether the similarity is brought about intentionally (though we
may expect planned coordination to provide a stronger or a more
salient cue to similarity). The agent-specific hypothesis, in contrast,
does predict a distinction between the effects of emergent and planned
coordination on prosociality. Specifically, it leads us to expect increased
prosociality following planned coordination as compared to emergent
coordination, as only planned coordination indicates that one's partner
is willing to deliberately adapt her behavior to facilitate one's actions or
goals.
In one study bearing upon this issue, participants observed agents
walking synchronously or asynchronously and were asked to rate the
level of rapport they perceived between the agents (Lakens & Stel,
2011). Crucially, participants viewing the synchronous walkers were
either told that the two agents had been instructed to walk in synchrony
or that they had spontaneously fallen into synchrony. The key finding
was only participants who believed that the two agents had sponta-
neously synchronized with each other perceived them to have greater
rapport than the asynchronous walkers. This suggests that synchrony
leads to the appearance of rapport not because of similarity at the level
of behavior but because of what it leads observers to infer about agents'
attitudes towards each other. It is important to note, however, that
these findings do not enable us to draw firm conclusions about whether
participants' inferences concerning rapport were mediated by the at-
tribution of an intention to synchronize. A follow-up to the original
study by Lakens and Stel could investigate whether the relationship
between rapport and synchrony when actors are not instructed to
synchronize depends on whether they have intentionally decided to
synchronize (planned coordination) or unintentionally fallen into syn-
chrony (emergent coordination).
4.1.4. In-phase versus anti-phase coordination
What about the difference between in-phase coordination (e.g. A
taps her finger as B taps his, they both raise their fingers at the same
time, then again tap them at the same time, etc) and anti-phase co-
ordination (e.g. A taps her finger while B raises his, then vice versa,
etc…)? Anti-phase coordination is an interesting test case insofar it
requires two agents to mutually adapt to each other while performing
very different, even opposite, actions. As such, it is paradigmatic for a
broad range of cases in which two agents adapt to each other while
performing different actions (A blows into a trumpet while B plays the
drums), or performing similar actions in a non-synchronized but
nevertheless temporally coordinated pattern.
Here, again, different versions of the group identification hypothesis
diverge according to the level at which they assume that the perception
of similarity is relevant. Hypotheses which assume that group-identi-
fication is triggered by the perception of self-other similarity at the level
of behavior lead us to expect a boost to prosociality from in-phase
synchronization, but not from anti-phase synchronization, since in the
latter case the two agents' actions are diametrically opposed. This
prediction is consistent with the results of Wiltermuth and Heath
(2009), where anti-phase synchronization was implemented as a con-
trol condition. In contrast, hypotheses which assume that group-iden-
tification is triggered by the perception of similarity at the level of goals
predict that anti-phase synchronization should boost prosociality to the
same extent as in-phase synchronization, since in both cases the two
agents are contributing to the maintenance of a single pattern. Simi-
larly, agent-specific hypotheses do not lead us to expect a difference
between in-phase and anti-phase coordination, because these both
involve adapting to one's partner's behavior. This prediction is con-
sistent with the results of Miles et al. (2009) and of Cross et al. (2016,
Exp. 2), which indicated a boost to rapport following anti-phase syn-
chronization.
4.1.5. Further points of comparison
In addition to the aforementioned parameters of situations invol-
ving coordination, there are a range of further points of contrast be-
tween agent-specific hypotheses and group-identification hypotheses.
One such point of contrast is the question as to whether we should
expect prosocial behaviors and attitudes following coordination to be
directed specifically towards one's coordination partner, towards
groups of agents, or towards others in general. The agent-specific hy-
pothesis clearly predicts the former. In contrast, the group-identifica-
tion hypothesis may predict that such prosocial effects of coordination
extend to other members of the same group – i.e. if coordination leads A
to identify B as an ingroup member, then we may expect A to be pro-
socially motivated not only towards B but towards other individuals
perceived as belonging to the same group as B. The available findings in
the literature present a complex picture, making it difficult to evaluate
these predictions. Consistent with the agent-specific hypothesis, some
studies have revealed prosocial effects of coordination which do not
extend to anyone other than the person with whom participants co-
ordinated (Cross, Wilson, & Golonka, 2019; Kokal et al., 2011). The
prediction of the group-identification hypothesis also enjoys some
support from a recent study showing a reduction in Hungarian parti-
cipants' negative attitudes towards Roma individuals in general after
synchronized walking with a Roma participant (Atherton, Sebanz, &
Cross, 2019). Moreover, in the developmental literature, Cirelli et al.
(2016) found that infants who had been bounced in synchrony with an
adult were more likely to help not only that same adult (compared to a
condition in which they had been bounced out of synchrony with the
adult) but also a third party with whom that adult had affiliated. In
contrast to these findings, Reddish et al. (2014) did find that co-
ordinated movement boosted participants' willingness to share re-
sources with others who had been involved in a different task. Further
research is needed in order to pinpoint the factors which may influence
any generalization of the prosocial effects of coordination beyond the
specific coordination partner.
A related point is that the group identification hypothesis, unlike the
agent-specific hypothesis, implies that the effects of coordination are
mediated by the same mechanism as other prosocial effects of group
identification. If this is correct, then we might expect coordination not
to have any effect on prosociality in a context in which the other in-
dividual is already perceived as an ingroup member. And indeed, this is
precisely what Cross, Turgeon, and Atherton (2019) found. A related
prediction is that if coordination boosts prosociality by means of group-
identification, then we may expect such effects of coordination to be
blocked by cues indicating that the other agent is not in one's ingroup.
Finally, a further point of contrast is that group-identification me-
chanisms might be more basic, and thus developmentally prior to,
agent-specific hypotheses. This conjecture is motivated by the ob-
servation that the former requires only that an agent notice a similarity
between herself and another agent. The latter, in contrast, involves not
only noticing what the other agent is doing, but drawing inferences
about the motivation underlying this behavior – that the other agent is
acting as they are because they are attempting to adapt to one's own
behavior. That is, group-identification hypotheses may be less cogni-
tively demanding than agent-specific hypotheses (insofar as they do not
require inferences about underlying motivations). In support of this
prediction, we know that infants can identify similarities and dissim-
ilarities between themselves and others from the first year of life
(Garcia Coll, Garcia Miranda, Buzzetta Torres, & Nogueras Bermúdez,
2018; Pun, Ferera, Diesendruck, Kiley Hamlin, & Baron, 2018; Xiao
et al., 2018), and that prosocial helping behavior in infants and young
children is boosted by synchronization (Cirelli et al., 2014; Cirelli et al.,
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2016) and other forms of coordination (Barragan & Dweck, 2014).
4.2. Trust, concern for others' well-being or a sense of commitment?
A useful starting point in distinguishing among these hypothesized
mechanisms is the observation that trust helps only indirectly to sustain
agents' motivation to act cooperatively – i.e., it stabilizes one agent's
expectation that her partner will continue acting in a cooperative
manner, and thereby reduces a source of uncertainty which could un-
dermine the first agent's motivation to act cooperatively. But it does not
directly explain why that first agent would then herself want to act in a
cooperative manner.
To illustrate, consider one study investigating effects of decision-
making coordination upon subsequent cooperation. Rusch and Luetge
(2016) reasoned that humans may be equipped with social decision-
making processes which do ‘not differentiate between instances of co-
ordination and cooperation too sharply, at least initially, reflecting the
hypothesized predominance and earlier evolutionary solution of co-
ordination problems in our ancestral social ecology’ (Rusch & Luetge,
2016: 292). If so, then successful coordination with a partner in a re-
peated coordination game may lead people to view their partner as
being a reliable partner in general, and therefore also as someone who
is likely to resist temptations to behave selfishly (e.g. to cooperate in a
prisoners' dilemma). As a result, they themselves should be more likely
to cooperate with a partner with whom they share a history of suc-
cessful coordination. Rusch and Luetge (2016) found evidence of a
‘spillover effect’ from coordination to cooperation, i.e. cooperation
rates in a prisoners' dilemma were boosted when rounds of the pris-
oners' dilemma were interspersed among rounds of a coordination game
(i.e. the stag hunt) played together with a fixed partner.
But while Rusch & Luetge's hypothesis explains why successful co-
ordination may lead participants to trust that their partner will not
defect, this does not directly explain why they themselves would then
choose to cooperate. As a result, it can only explain why cooperation
rates would not fall below the level corresponding to what participants
prefer; it does not provide any explanation of why coordination may
directly boost cooperation rates. To explain this, we would need to
identify a mechanism that accounts for a boost in prosociality – such as
a genuine concern for one's partner's well-being, or a sense of com-
mitment to the partner. In other words, cooperation in a standard
prisoners' dilemma depends not only on participants' trust that their
partner will cooperate but also on a motivation to cooperate. In Rusch &
Luetge's study, it is therefore difficult to determine whether successful
coordination boosted cooperation rates by affecting trust, concern for
the partner, the sense of commitment, or some combination of these.
How could one isolate any effects of coordination upon trust? Trust/
investment games may seem at first blush to be well-suited to this
purpose, but may also confound these factors, insofar as an investor
may contribute in part out of generosity or out of a sense of commit-
ment – i.e. to ensure that the trustee receives a good outcome. In order
to address this, one possibility would be to design a trust game in which
an investor's decision does not affect the outcome for the trustee.
One way to isolate the motivation to bring about a benefit to one's
partner – i.e. to specifically assess the effects of coordination upon a
concern for a partner's well-being or upon the sense of commitment
independently of trust – is to implement a one-sided social dilemma,
such as a dictator game, in which only one player is faced with a
temptation to defect. Since the decision of the dictator in a dictator
game fully determines the outcome, she does not need to trust in the
good will of her partner. This is the strategy adopted a study by Guala
and Mittone (2010), which found evidence of a boost to prosociality in
a dictator game following decision-making coordination. It must be
noted, however, that this method does not distinguish between proso-
ciality motivated by concern for the recipient and prosociality moti-
vated by a sense of commitment to one's partner.
But how to tease apart concern for a partner's well-being and a sense
of commitment to one's partner? We identify three possibilities. One
would be to manipulate the amount of effort or other costs (including
opportunity costs) which participants believe their partners have had to
invest in order to sustain coordination. As noted above, it has been
shown (Chennells & Michael, 2018; Székely & Michael, 2018) that the
motivation to remain engaged in a boring joint action, and to resist
tempting alternative options and distractions, is governed in part by an
implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by the amount of
effort that one's partner has invested in the joint action. Building upon
this idea, Mills, Harry, Stevens, Knoblich, and Keller (2018) found that
participants' belief that their partner was adapting to them deliberately
led to improved performance on a synchronization task. They suggest
that this may have been because participants felt a sense of commit-
ment to reciprocate the effort they believed their partner was investing.
It must be noted that an increase in prosociality following upon a
partner's investment of effort or other costs in a coordinated activity
may be explained not only by appeal to a sense of commitment to the
partner but also by appeal to a concern for the partner's well-being.
However, a sense of commitment, unlike a concern for the partner's
well-being, should be sensitive to the extent to which one believes that
the partner's investment of effort or other costs was made on the basis of
an expectation about how one would reciprocate.
A second possibility would be to investigate the degree to which an
agent is willing to help her partner achieve a goal that is bad for the
partner in the long-run, but which the partner nevertheless wants. An
example of this sort of prosociality might be, say, purchasing cigarettes
for a friend when you are in a country where cigarettes are relatively
cheap - it is certainly bad for your friend, but it is still prosocial insofar
as you are doing your friend a favour (they want the cigarettes). In this
case, one may be acting out of a sense of commitment to one's partner
but not necessarily out of a concern for her well-being.
A third possibility arises from the observation that agents can not
only be committed to each other but also to goals themselves. This is
something that cannot be said of trust or concern for another agent's
well-being - these are inherently tied to other agents, whereas one can
be committed to bringing about a particular outcome independently of
other agents. Importantly, agents sometimes find themselves committed
to others' goals in virtue of being committed to the other agent. For
instance, in committing myself to help another agent with a particular
goal, I may take on that agent's goal as my own. If the other agent
abandons that goal, I may then continue to pursue it anyway. Different
versions of this basic idea have been referred to as goal contagion (e.g.
see Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Dik & Aarts, 2007; Jia, Tong, &
Lee, 2014; Loersch, Aarts, Keith Payne, & Jefferis, 2008; Pontus & Shah,
2013), or goal slippage (Michael & Székely, 2017). Goal contagion or
goal slippage might result from, or be enhanced by, the perception of a
joint action partner's effort investment, insofar as effort investment may
elicit a sense of commitment to one's partner (and consequently to one's
partner's goals). Suppose that agents A and B coordinate in such a
manner that B invests considerable effort (thereby eliciting a sense of
commitment on the part of A). Agent A may then feel committed to
helping B with her goals. If B were to abandon her goal, A's sense of
commitment may lead her to complete B's abandoned goal anyway.
5. Conclusion
We have attempted to provide structure and constraints, as well as
fresh insight, to the burgeoning research investigating prosocial effects
of coordination. First, we have proposed working definitions of co-
ordination and of prosocial behavior and attitudes, and identified a
range of typical features of coordination which may be important in
mediating between coordination and prosociality. We have also in-
troduced a pair of distinctions among mechanisms by which co-
ordination may boost prosociality, and made several suggestions as to
how these mechanisms could be teased apart empirically. We hope that
this conceptual groundwork will provide structure and direction for
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future empirical research testing the hypotheses spelled out here, and
also for theoretical work developing mathematical formalizations of the
concepts and the hypotheses we have articulated.
Needless to say, our attempt to tease apart various distinct hy-
potheses about mechanisms does not imply that only one of them is
correct, or that any one of them should be able to explain all instances
in which coordination provides a boost to prosociality. Rather, different
mechanisms may be at work in different contexts, and in some contexts
they may also act in concert. This opens up new directions for future
research investigating the relationship among different mechanisms
mediating between coordination and prosociality.
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